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WHY POLITICAL RELIANCE ON RELIGIOUSLY GROUNDED
MORALITY DOES NOT VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE
MICHAEL J. PERRY*
I say, sir, that the purity of the Christian church, the purity of
our holy religion, and the preservation of our free institutions,
require that Church and State shall be separated; that the
preacher on the Sabbath day shall find his text in the Bible;
shall preach "Jesus Christ and him crucified;" shall preach from
the Holy Scriptures, and not attempt to control the political
organizations and political parties of the day.
-Senator Stephen A. Douglas'
* University Distinguished Chair in Law, Wake Forest University. @ 2001, Michael J.
Perry. This Essay is my contribution to the conference on "Religion in the Public Square"
at William & Mary Law School on March 24,2000. I was honored to present a version of
this Essay in three other venues: on March 1, 2000, as the Calvin W. Corman Lecture at
Rutgers University (Camden) School of Law; on March 2, 2000, as a lecture at Lafayette
College (Easton, Pennsylvania); and on November 3,2000, as an address to the conference
on "Law, Religion, and the Public Good" at St. John's University School of Law. I am
grateful to the audiences in all four venues for vigorous and clarifying discussion. I am also
grateful, for helpful comments, to Tom Berg, Dan Conkle, Perry Dane, Chris Eberle,
Stephen Gardbaum, Andy Koppelman, DougLaycock, Michael McConnell, and Steve Smith.
This Essay is one of a series of five essays on religion in politics. Two other essays in the
series will be published in a symposium issue of the Wake Forest Law Review. See Michael
J. Perry, Why Political Reliance on Religiously Grounded Morality Is Not Illegitimate in a
Liberal Democracy, 36 WAXE FOREST L. REv. (forthcoming May 2001) [hereinafter Perry,
Political Reliance]; Michael J. Perry, Christians, the Bible, and Same-Sex Unions: An
Argument for Political Self-Restraint, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming May 2001).
Another of the essays-a lecture I am due to give at University of Dayton School of Law on
February 8,2001-will be published in the University of Dayton Law Review. See Michael
J. Perry, Catholics, the Magisteriurm, and Moral Controversy: AnArgumentforIndependent
Judgment, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. (forthcoming 2001). The final of the five essays-my
McElroy Lecture at University of Detroit Mercy School of Law on April 5, 2001-will be
published in the University of Detroit Mercy Law Review. See Michael J. Perry, Religion,
Politics, and Abortion, U. DET. MERCYL. REV. (forthcoming 2001).
1. CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 656 (1854). Thanks to Doug Laycock for
calling this passage to my attention.
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Imagine a legislator who must decide whether to vote to outlaw,
or otherwise disfavor, particular conduct-abortion, for example, or
same-sex unions. She wonders what weight, if any, she should put
on her religiously grounded belief that the conduct is immoral; in
particular, she worries that it might not be appropriate for her to
disfavor the conduct on the basis of her religiously grounded moral
belief.2 In another essay in the series of which this Essay is a part,
I argue that the morality of liberal democracy does not counsel her
against disfavoring the conduct on the basis of religiously grounded
moral belief.' In this Essay, I pursue a different but, for us citizens
2. Let me clarify the idea of a moral belief-for example, the belief that homosexual
sexual conduct is always immoral-that is "religiously" grounded.
First: For purposes of my argument in this Essay, a moral belief is "religiously" grounded,
in whole or in part, if it is rooted, in whole or in part, in one or more of three ideas:
0 The idea of a God-inspired text (or texts), like the Bible, believed to teach moral
truth-if not all moral truth, at least all the moral truth one needs to be saved.
* The idea of a God-anointed figure (or figures), like the Pope, believed to teach moral
truth.
* The idea of a God-created and -maintained order-including, in particular, a God-
fashioned human nature-believed to be a fundamental criterion of moral truth.
Second: The religious grounding vel non of a moral beliefis person-relative: A moral belief
that is religiously grounded for one person may not be for another. Two persons may both
believe that homosexual sexual conduct is always immoral but each for a different reason:
one, solely for a religious reason, the other, solely for a nonreligious (secular) reason. In the
strong sense in which I mean it here, a person's moral belief is religiously "grounded" if and
only if she accepts the moral belief because she accepts one or more religious premises that
support the belief-for example, the premise that the Bible teaches that the conduct is
immoral-and if she would not accept the belief if she did not accept the supporting religious
premise or premises. Thus, a person's moral belief is not religiously grounded, in this strong
sense, if she would accept the belief even if she did not accept any supporting religious
premise-that is, if she would accept it solely because she accepts one or more nonreligious
(secular) premises that support the belief. Basing a political choice on a moral belief that is
religiously grounded, in the sensejust indicated, poses intheirmost difficult and urgentform
the various questions about religion in politics addressed in the series ofessays of which this
Essay is a part. See sources cited supra note *. Assume that, as I argue in another essay in
the series, basing a political choice on a religiously grounded moral belief is not problematic
according to the morality of liberal democracy. See Perry, Political Reliance, supra note *. It
follows, then, a fortiori, that it is not problematic for a person to base a political choice on a
moral belief that, for her, is religiously grounded in a weaker sense: a moral belief that,
though she accepts it because she accepts one or more religious premises that support it, she
would accept even if she did not accept any supporting religious premise.
3. See sources cited supra note *.
4. See Perry, Political Reliance, supra note *.
In the strong sense in which I mean it here, to make a political choice "on the basis of' a
belief-to base the choice on the belief-is to make a political choice that one would not make
in the absence of the belief. (To make a political choice partly, not solely, "on the basis of" a
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of the United States, complementary inquiry: Does the United
States's constitutional morality of religious freedom-in particular,
the requirement that government not "establish" religion-forbid
government to disfavor conduct on the basis of a religiously
grounded belief that the conduct is imnnoral? That the morality of
liberal democracy does not counsel a legislator or other policymaker
against disfavoring conduct on the basis of religiously grounded
moral belief does not entail that the nonestablishment norm (as I
prefer to call it) permits government to disfavor conduct on the
basis of religiously grounded moral belief. As I have explained
elsewhere, the nonestablishment norm that is part of American
constitutional law is, in some respects, more restrictive than the
morality of liberal democracy; in some respects, the limitations
placed on government by the nonestablishment norm are greater
than, they go beyond, the limitations placed on government by the
morality of liberal democracy.'
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
famously insists that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances." Yet, according to the authoritative case
belief is still to make a political choice that one would not make in the absence of the belief.)
To rely on a belief in making a political choice is not necessarily to base the choice on the
belief: One may be relying on the belief as principal or merely as additional support for a
choice that one would make on the basis of some other ground, even in the absence of the
belief. The claim that one may not base a political choice on a belief of a certain kind-for
example, a religiously grounded belief-is therefore weaker, in the sense of less restrictive,
than the claim that one may not rely on the belief at all, that one may not put any weight
whatsoever on the belief, in making a political choice. If the weaker (less restrictive) claim
cannot be sustained, then afortiori the stronger (more restrictive) claim cannot be sustained
either. If, as I conclude in the essay cited at the beginning of this note, the weaker claim
cannot be sustained that, according to the morality of liberal democracy, one may not make
a political choice disfavoring conduct on the basis of a religiously grounded belief that the
conduct is immoral, itisunnecessaryto focus on the stronger claim that in making the choice
one may not rely on the belief at all. And if, as I conclude in this Essay, the weaker claim
cannot be sustained that, under the nonestablishment norm, government may not disfavor
conduct on the basis of a religiously grounded belief that the conduct is immoral, it is
unnecessary to focus on the stronger nonestablishment claim that in disfavoring the conduct
government may not rely on the belief at all.
5. See Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Religion in the United States: Fin de Sibcle
Sketches, 75 IND. L.J. 295, 327-29 (2000) [hereinafter, Perry, Freedom of Religion].
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law-law that is constitutional bedrock in the United States 6 -it is
not just "Congress" but all three branches of the national
government that may not prohibit the free exercise of religion,
abridge the freedom of speech, etc. Moreover, it is not just the
(whole) national government but the government of every state that
may not do what the First Amendment forbids. I have suggested
elsewhere that there is a path from the text of the First
Amendment, which speaks just of Congress, to the authoritative
case law.7 But even if there were no such path, it would nonetheless
be constitutional bedrock in the United States that neither the
national government nor state government may either prohibit the
free exercise of religion or establish religion (or abridge "the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances").' For Americans at the beginning of the twenty-first
6. On the idea of constitutional "bedrock," see MICHAELJ. PERRY, WETHE PEOPLE: THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE SUPREME COuRT 20-23 (1999).
7. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POIUTICS: CONSTITIONAL AND MORAL
PERSPECTIVES 10-12 (1997). On the controversial question whether the Fourteenth
Amendment was meant to make the First Amendment's "free exercise" and
"nonestablishment" norms applicable to the states, see Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption
of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw.
U. L. REv. 1106 (1994), and Kurt T. Lash, The SecondAdoption of the Establishment Clause:
The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085 (1995). Lash argues that
the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to make applicable to the states both a broad free
exercise norm and a nonestablishment norm. For a recent instance of the argument that the
Fourteenth Amendment was not meant to make the First Amendment's nonestablishment
norm applicable to the states, see Jonathan P. Brose, In Birmingham They Love the
Governor: Why the Fourteenth Amendment Does Not Incorporate the Establishment Clause,
24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1 (1998). For the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment was not
meant to make any First Amendment norm applicable to the states, see Jay S. Bybee, Taking
Liberties With the First Amendment: Congress, Section 5, and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1539 (1995).
8. See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response
to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 685, 690 (1992) ("The government may not 'establish'
religion and it may not'prohibit' religion."). McConnell explains, in a footnote attached to the
word "establish," that:
The text [of the First Amendment] states the "Congress" may make no law
"respecting an establishment" of religion, which meant that Congress could
neither establish a national church nor interfere with the establishment of state
churches as they then existed in the various states. After the last
disestablishment in 1833 and the incorporation ofthe FirstAmendment against
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, this "federalism" aspect of the
Amendment has lost its significance, and the Clause can be read as forbidding
the government to establish religion.
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century, the serious practical question is no longer whether the
"free exercise" and "nonestablishment" norms apply to the whole of
American government, including state government. They do so
apply. And there is no going back. The sovereignty of the free
exercise and nonestablishment norms over every branch and level
of American government-in particular, their sovereignty over state
government as well as the national government-is now, as I said,
constitutional bedrock in the United States. For Americans today,
the serious practical inquiry is what it means to say that
government (state as well as national) may neither prohibit the free
exercise of religion nor establish religion. I have addressed
elsewhere, at length, what it means to say that government may
not prohibit the free exercise of religion.9 It is not the free exercise
norm that bears on the problem we are now addressing, however,
but the other constituent of the American constitutional law of
religious freedom: the nonestablishment norm. In the United
States, what does it mean to say that government may not establish
religion? What does the nonestablishment norm forbid government
to do?
The idea of an "established" church is a familiar one. For
Americans, the best known example is the Church of England,
which, from before the time of the American founding to the
present, has been the established church in England.0 (Though, of
course, the Church of England was much more established in the
past than it is today.") In the United States, unlike in England,
Id. at 690 n.19.
9. See Perry, Freedom of Religion, supra note 5, at 297-302.
10. Cf Aklil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Foreword." the Document and
the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26,119 (2000) ("Let us recall the world the Founders aimed
to repudiate, a world where a powerful church hierarchy was anointed as the official
government religion, where clerics ex officio held offices in the government, and where
members of other religions were often barred from holding government posts.").
11. What is the present reality? Professor Saunders observes:
The special status of the Church of England manifests through legal links
with the British crown. Under legislation, the reigning queen or king is
"supreme governor" of the church and swears a coronation oath to maintain it.
As such, the monarch may not be a Catholic, or marry a Catholic, and must
declare on accession to the throne that he or she is a Protestant.
This is surprising enough in a western liberal democracy at the end of the
twentieth century. But there is more. The monarch also appoints the
archbishops and other leading church dignitaries. Twenty-six of these "Lords
Spiritual" sit in the upper house of the legislature, the House of Lords. The
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there may be no established religion: The nonestablishment norm
forbids government to enact any law or pursue any policy that
treats one or more churches as the official church or churches of the
political community; government may not bestow legal favor or
privilege on one or more churches-that is, one or more churches as
such-in relation to one or more other churches or to no church at
all. More precisely: Government may not take any action that favors
one or more churches in relation to one or more other churches, or to
no church at all, on the basis of the view that the favored church(es)
is, as a church-as a community of faith-better along one or
another dimension of value (truer, for example, or more efficacious
spiritually, or more authenticallyAmerican). The nonestablishment
norm deprives government ofjurisdiction to make judgments about
which churche(es), if any, is, as such, better than another church.
British Parliament can legislate for the church and prescribe modes ofworship,
doctrine and discipline. And the church has delegated legislative authority in
relation to church affairs. Measures initiated by the church may be accepted or
rejected, but not amended, by the Parliament and override earlier inconsistent
law.
Cheryl Saunders, Comment: Religion and the State, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1295, 1295 (2000).
Professor Saunders then states:
As usual with the British system of government, however, what you see is
not exactly what you get. In advising the crown on appointments to church
positions, the prime minister draws names from a list provided by church
authorities. As a practical matter, Parliament is unlikely to veto legislative
measures initiated by the church, or to act unilaterally in relation to other
church affairs. Vernon Bogdanor draws attention to a House of Commons
debate on the ordination of women priests in 1993, in which several Members
expressed the view that the House should not be discussing the issue at all.
Id. at 1295-96. Clearly, and happily, that England has established a church does not mean
everything it once meant.
We must, of course, keep a sense of proportion. The advantages of
establishment enjoyed by the Church of England or by the Lutheran Church in
Sweden are scarcely on a scale as to lead anyone to feel seriously discriminated
against. In contrast, denying the vote to Roman Catholics or requiring
subscription to the Church of England as a condition of entry to Oxford or
Cambridge did constitute a serious source of grievance. Strict adherence to
justice as impartiality would, no doubt, be incompatible with the existence of
an established church at all. But departures from it are venial so long as nobody
is put at a significant disadvantage, either by having barriers put in the way of
worshiping according to the tenets of his faith or by having his rights and
opportunities in other matters (politics, education, or occupation, for example)
materially limited on the basis of his religious beliefs.
BRIAN BARRY, A TREATISE ON SOCIAL JUSTICE VOLUME II: JUSTICE AS IMPARTIALITY 165 n.c
(Oxford Political Theory, 1995).
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The norm requires government to be agnostic about which
church-which community of faith-is better; government must act
without regard to whether any church is in fact better than another.
In particular, government may not privilege, in law or policy,
membership in one or more churches-in the Fifth Avenue Baptist
Church, for example, or in the Roman Catholic Church, or in the
Christian church generally;' 2 nor may it privilege a worship
practice-a prayer, liturgical rite, or religious observance-of one
or more churches.1 3
From 1947, when the Supreme Court first applied the
nonestablishment norm to the states, 14 to the present, the justices
of the Court have been divided about what it means to say that
government may not establish religion.'" The division among the
present justices is as great as it has ever been. 6 This state of affairs
partly explains why I am not interested in ferreting out the
12. Consider this, as an example of a position that privileges the Catholic Church
generally-
The revelation of Christ is "definitive and complete", Pope John Paul affirmed
to the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, on 28 January. He repeated
the phrase twice in an address which went on to say that non-Christians live
in "a deficient situation, compared to those who have the fullness of salvific
means in the Church".
Other Faiths are Deficient, Pope Says, TABLET (London), Feb. 5, 2000, at 157. The harsh
doctrine that there is no salvation outside the Church has been revised, however: "[Pope
John Paul II] recognized, following the Second Vatican Council, that non-Christians can
reach eternal life if they seek God with a sincere heart. But in that 'sincere search' they are
in fact 'ordered' towards Christ and his Church." Id. (citation omitted).
13. Cf Douglas Laycock, FreedomofSpeech ThatlsBothReligiousandPolitical, 19U.C.
DAVISL. REV. 793,812 (1996) (arguingthat "[a]tthe core ofthe Establishment Clause should
be the principle that government cannot engage in a religious observance or compel or
persuade citizens to do so").
What the nonestablishment norm forbids is one question. Another, and different, inquiry
arises when we have answered the question what the nonestablishment norm forbids: Is it
a good thing that the nonestablishment norm is part of our constitutional law, or is it a bad
thing? I have argued elsewhere that it is a good thing. See Perry, Freedom of Religion, supra
note 5, at 326-32. Most Americans believe that it is a good thing. But there is, among
Americans, not just one answer to the question why it is a good thing, and not every answer
will appeal to every person. For example, although some secular answers may appeal to some
religious believers, religiously grounded answers will not appeal to nonbelievers.
14. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
15. Akhil Amar has recently referred to "the many outlandish (and contradictory) things
that have been said about [the nonestablishment norm] in the United StatesReports." Amar,
supra note 10, at 119.
16. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203
(1997); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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Supreme Court's answer to the question what the nonestablishment
norm forbids government to do: There is no such animal. But even
if there were such an animal, my principal concern here would not
be the Court's answer. The preceding paragraph is meant to state,
not the Court's answer, but the best answer.
Similarly, the paragraphs that follow are meant to present the
best answer to the question of whether political reliance on
religiously grounded morality violates the nonestablishment norm,
not to predict the answer the Court would give. But, as it happens,
there is no reason to doubt that the present Supreme Court--a
majority of it, at least-would give what I defend in this Essay as
the best answer, though, for reasons I give below, it is difficult to
imagine a case that would present the serious version of the
question: May government ban or otherwise conduct on the basis of
a religiously grounded belief that the conduct is immoral when the
belief lacks plausible, independent secular grounding? I explain
below why this is the serious version of the question.
I have discussed elsewhere various problems-various
conflicts-that have arisen under the nonestablishment norm,
including prayer in public schools and government financial aid to
religiously affiliated schools and other institutions. 7 Here I want to
address this nonestablishment problem: Does the nonestablishment
norm forbid legislators or other policymakers, in voting to ban or
otherwise disfavor conduct, like abortion or same-sex marriage, to
act on the basis of their religiously grounded belief that the conduct
is immoral? 8 It does not. As I said, the nonestablishment norm
forbids government to privilege one or more churches. It does not
forbid legislators (or other policymakers), even when they happen
to constitute a legislative majority, to make a political choice
disfavoring conduct on the basis of a religiously grounded belief that
the conduct is immoral; that is, it does not forbid them to base the
political choice on a moral belief just in virtue of the fact that, for
them, that belief is religiously grounded.
Now, one may want to insist that the nonestablishment norm
forbids government not just to privilege, in law or policy, one or
17. See Perry, Freedom of Religion, supra note 5, at 316-26.
18. Again, to act"on the basis of" a belief is to take action that one would not have taken
in the absence of the belief. See supra note 4.
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more churches, but also to take action based on religiously
grounded belief, including any religiously grounded moral belief.
But does it? As I said earlier, it is constitutional bedrock for us
Americans that government may not establish religion (or prohibit
the free exercise thereof). Although the nonestablishment norm that
is constitutional bedrock for us Americans forbids government to
privilege one or more churches, it does not go so far as to forbid
government to take action based on religiously grounded moral
belief. No such rule is-no such rule has ever become-part of our
constitutional bedrock. 9 Nor does authoritative case law contain
any such rule, as Justice Scalia has emphasized:
Our cases in no way imply that the Establishment Clause
forbids legislators merely to act upon their religious convictions.
We surely would not strike down a law providing money to feed
the hungry or shelter the homeless if it could be demonstrated
that, but for the religious beliefs of the legislators, the funds
would not have been approved.... [Plolitical activism by the
religiously motivated is part of our heritage.20
19. It bears mention that no generation of "We the People" ever established, as part of
our constitutional law, any such rule. The first part of the constitutional text-the
Preamble-declares:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United
States of America.
U.S. CONST. preamble. In American constitutional culture, few if any persons-even,
remarkably, few if any constitutional theorists-disagree that the Constitution comprises at
least some directives issued by-that is, some norms "ordained and established" by-"We the
People." More to the point, few disagree that the Constitution comprises some such norms
partly because the norms were "ordained and established" by "We the People." It is now a
convention-an axiom--ofAmerican constitutional culture that "We the People ofthe United
States" not only "do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States ofAmerica"
but may ordain and establish it. This is not to say that only "We the People" may establish
norms as constitutional. Nor is it to deny that a norm never established as constitutional by
"We the People" can become constitutional bedrock for us. For a discussion of all of this, see
PERRY, supra note 6, at 15-23.
20. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 615 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). "Today's
religious activism may give us the Balanced Treatment Act [which according to the majority
inAguilard violated the nonestablishment norm], but yesterday's resulted in the abolition
of slavery, and tomorrow's may bring relief for famine victims." Id
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However, to say that the rule that government may not take
action based on religiously grounded moral belief is neither part of
our constitutional bedrock nor even contained in our authoritative
case law is not to say that the rule should not become part of our
constitutional law; it is not to say that the Supreme Court should
not constitutionalize the rule. Perhaps the rule should become part
of our constitutional law. But the rule that government may not
take action based on religiously grounded moral belief should not
become part of our constitutional law; the rule should not become
part of the content of the nonestablishment norm.
Let us begin with the practical impediments to construing the
nonestablishment norm to disable government-that is, to disable
legislators and other policymakers-from outlawing or otherwise
disfavoring conduct on the basis of a religiously grounded belief that
the conduct is immoral. (Remember: The nonestablishment norm,
however construed, is, like the free exercise norm, a constitutional
norm and, as such, is supposed to be judicially enforceable and
enforced.)
* For virtually every moral belief on which a legislature might be
tempted to rely in disfavoring conduct-for example, the belief that
abortion, or homosexual sexual conduct, is immoral-it is the case
that although for many persons the belief is religiously grounded
(grounded on a religious premise or premises), for many others the
belief is not religiously grounded but, instead, is grounded wholly
on secular (nonreligious) premises. How, then, is a court to decide
whether a law banning abortion (for example) would have been
enacted even in the absence of the religious premises? Indeed, a
legislator may well be uncertain whether she would have supported
the law in the absence of the religious premises.
* In the unlikely event that there is a confident answer to such
a counterfactual inquiry, is it prudent to fashion a nonestablish-
ment requirement the judicial enforcement of which could easily
lead to this state of affairs: One state's antiabortion law is adjudged
unconstitutional by a court because in the court's opinion the law
probably would not have been enacted in the absence of the
religious premises, but another state's virtually identical
antiabortion law is adjudged constitutional by a different court
because in the court's opinion the law probably would have been
enacted in the absence of the religious premises?
672 [Vol. 42:663
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* Moreover, is it prudent to fashion a nonestablishment
requirement the likely principal yield of which is that legislatures
would engage in strategic behavior (in particular, they would
trumpet secular premises) aimed at making it appear that the
antiabortion law would have been enacted even in the absence of
the religious premises?
The judiciary could steer around such obstacles-it could opt for
a"second best" solution-by construing the nonestablishment norm
to require, not that the law in question would have been enacted
even in the absence of religious premises, but only that the moral
belief on which the legislature based the law, a moral belief that for
many persons is religiously grounded, have an independent secular
ground-that it be a moral belief that for some persons is not
religiously grounded." But that requirement is so weak as to be
inconsequential: What moral belief on which a legislature in the
United States is likely to rely, in banning or otherwise disfavoring
conduct, lacks a secular ground? Consider, for example, both the
belief that abortion is immoral and the belief that same-sex unions
are immoral: Neither belief lacks a secular ground. Although many
who believe that abortion is immoral do so only on the basis of a
religious premise (or premises), others do so on the basis of a
secular premise as well as on the basis of a religious premise;
indeed, some do so only on the basis of a secular premise. The same
holds true for many who believe that same-sex unions are immoral.
Indeed, some who affim that abortion is immoral and some who
affirm that same-sex unions are immoral are not religious believers.
One might respond by saying that the nonestablishment
requirement (i.e., the "second best" requirement) should not be
merely that the moral belief on which the legislature based the law
have an independent secular ground, but that the independent
21. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. Cm. L. REV.
195,197 (1992) ("[Tihe negative bar against establishment ofreligion implies the affirmative
'establishment' of a civil order for the resolution of public moral disputes.... [Plublic moral
disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms.").
Recall that, as I explained earlier, the religious grounding vel non of a moral belief is
person-relative: A moral belief that is religiously grounded for one person may not be for
another. A belief that conduct is immoral is religiously"grounded" for a person if she would
not believe that the conduct is immoral if she did not credit one or more religious premises
that support the belief-for example, the premise that the Bible (understood as God-inspired
and therefore authoritative) teaches that the conduct is immoral. See supra note 2.
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secular ground be plausible. If the courts were to apply the
plausibility requirement in a deferential fashion, as they arguably
should,22 the requirement would be as inconsequential as the
rationality (or "rational basis") requirement has typically been in
the context of socioeconomic regulation.' Let us assume, then, for
the sake of discussion, that if the courts were to apply the
plausibility requirement at all, they would apply it in a non-
deferential fashion. The problem with the requirement, applied
nondeferentially, is evident: The secular bases of widely contro-
versial moral beliefs are typically both contestable and contested.
Authorizing (nondeferential) judicial inquiry into the "plausibility"
of the secular basis of a widely controversial moral belief comes
perilously close to inviting judges to substitute their moral
judgment for the moral judgment of legislators and other
policymakers. Such substitution is scarcely a desirable state of
affairs in a democracy. This is not to deny that in a constitutional
democracy a court should be prepared to substitute its
constitutional judgment for the constitutional judgment of a
legislature or other part of government. Nor is it to deny that a
constitutional provision might rule out, as a basis of political choice,
some moral judgments. For example, the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution rules out, as a basis of political
choice, the judgment that it is immoral for a "white" person to
marry a person who is not "white."24 My point is simply that we
should be wary about fashioning a constitutional requirement the
22. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REv. 129 (1893). See generally One Hundred Years ofJudicial
Review: The Thayer Centennial Symposium, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1993) (discussing the ideas
about constitutional law presented in Thayer's article).
23. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307,313-14 (1993) ("Where
there are 'plausible reasons' for Congress' action 'our inquiry is at an end."' (quoting United
States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980))).
24. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1967); PERRY, supra note 6, at 88-97.
Government may not disfavor conduct based on any racist belief-for example, the belief that
interracial marriage is immoral. This is not because the belief is false, or believed to be false,
but simply because government would be acting unconstitutionally; it would be making a
judgment that it is not constitutionally free to make. Of course, that the Constitution forbids
government to make a particular judgment-that interracial marriage is immoral, for
example, or that the Pope is the Antichrist and Roman Catholicism is a false religion-may
well be due, at least in part, to the fact that many believe the judgment to be false. Of course,
it may also be due solely to the fact that many believe that whether or not the judgment is
false, it is no part of the proper business of government to make the judgment.
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judicial enforcement of which practically invites judges to substitute
their moral judgments for those of legislators and other policy-
makers.'
There is, finally, another important reason to be wary about
construing the nonestablishment norm to forbid government to
disfavor conduct on the basis of a moral belief that, though
religiously grounded, lacks a plausible, independent secular
ground."6 Unlike the other reasons, this reason for wariness is not
about practical impediments or proper judicial role. It is about
impartiality between religious grounds and secular grounds for
moral belief; it is also about the equal citizenship of religious
believers. In that sense, this reason is about first principles and is
therefore the most fundamental reason of all to reject a construal
of the nonestablishment norm according to which government may
not disfavor conduct on the basis of a moral belief that, though
religiously grounded, lacks plausible, independent secular
grounding.
As I have explained elsewhere, there are three basic categories
of moral inquiry: (1) Which human beings should we care about; (2)
What is truly good for those we should care about, and what is bad
for them; and (3) How should we resolve conflicts between
goods-in particular, between what is good for some we should care
about and what is good for others we should care about?" (Andrew
25. See generally JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999) (discussing the
courts and legislatures as forums for resolving disagreements about justice and individual
rights).
26. Afortiori, it is a reason to be wary about construing the nonestablishment norm even
more radically to forbid government to disfavor conduct on the basis of a religiously grounded
moral belief-that is, to disfavor conduct that government would not disfavor in the absence
of a religious premise or premises.
27. When we are engaged in what we understand to be "moral" argument, most of us
seem to be arguing about one or more of three basic questions. In my Gianella Lecture, in
the course ofcommentingon the controversy among legal academics and contemporary moral
philosophers as to what the subject matter ofmorality is, I sketched the three questions. See
Michael J. Perry, What Is "Morality"Anyway?, 45 VILL. L. REV. 69, 98-105 (2000). It may be
helpful to rehearse the questions, or sets of questions, here.
First, and most fundamentally, "moral" argument is often about this:
Which human beings oughtwe to care about-which ones, that is, besides those
we already happen to care about, those we already happen to be emotionally or
sentimentally concerned for or attached to: ourselves, our families, our tribes,
and so on? Variations on the question: Which human beings ought to be the
beneficiaries of our respect; the welfare, the well-being, of which human beings
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ought to be the object of our concern? Which human beings are subjects of
justice; which are inviolable (or "sacred")? All human beings, or only some?
There is a related question, but it is really just a variation on the question about which
human beings are inviolable: Who is a human being; that is, what members of the species
Homo sapiens are truly, fully human? Women? Nonwhites? Jews? Cast as the claim that only
some individuals are human beings, the claim that only some human beings are inviolable
has been, and remains, quite common. According to Nazi ideology, for example, the Jews
were pseudohumans. See Johannes Morsink, World War Two and the Universal Declaration,
15 HuM. RTS. Q. 357, 363 (1993). There are countless other examples, past and present:
Serbian murderers and rapists do not think of themselves as violating human
rights. For they are not doing these things to fellow human beings, but to
Muslims. They are not being inhuman, but rather are discriminating between
the true humans and the pseudohumans. They are making the same sort of
distinction as the Crusaders made between humans and infidel dogs, and the
BlackMuslims make between humans and blue-eyed devils. [Thomas Jefferson]
was able both to own slaves and to think it self-evident that all men were
endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights. He had convinced
himself that the consciousness of Blacks, like that of animals, "participate[s]
more of sensation than reflection." Like the Serbs, Mr. Jefferson did not think
of himself as violating human rights.
The Serbs take themselves to be acting in the interests of true humanity by
purifying the world of pseudohumanity.
Richard Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE
OXFoRD AMNESTY LECTURES 1993, at 111, 112, 125 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds.,
1993).
Second, "moral" argument is often about this:
What is good-truly good-for those we should care about (including ourselves)?
And what is bad for them? In particular: What are the requirements of one's
well-being? (The 'one" may be, at one extreme, a particular human being or, at
the other, each and every human being.) What is friendly to (the achievement
of) one's well-being, and what is hostile to it? What is conducive to or even
constitutive of one's well-being, and what impedes or even destroys it?
Third, "moral" argument is often about priorities among conflicting goods:
Should I act in a way that is good for A (someone I should care about) in one
respect but bad for her in another? Or in a way that is good for A but not good,
or even bad, for B (someone else I should care about)? Or in a way that is good
for me but not good, or even bad, for you? (That, according to the Gospel vision,
I should love the Other does not mean that I should not love myself too.
According to the Gospel vision, I should love the Other"as myself'.) Orin away
that is good for my family (tribe, nation, etc.) but not good, or even bad, for your
family?
See generally GARTH L. HALLET, PRIORITIES AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS (New Studies in
Christian Ethics, 1998) (discussing the classic moral dilemma whether to prefer the
nearest-family-or the neediest-the starving). See also PETER UNGER, LIVING HIGH AND
LETri'NG DIE: OUR ILLUSION OF INNOCENCE (1996) (exploring our behavior towards people in
great need).
"Moral" argument is often and preeminently about one or more of these three large
subjects: Which human beings ought we to care about? What is truly good for those we
should care about-and what is bad for them? And how should we resolve conflicts among
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Koppelman asserts that the nonestablishment norm forbids
government to "formulate official answers to religious questions."'
But the three basic inquiries I have just articulated are not
"religious" questions. They are "moral" questions-albeit, moral
questions to which some persons sometimes give religiously
grounded answers.) For many religious believers in the United
States, no response to one or more of these three fundamental
moral questions is as plausible, if plausible at all, as a religiously
grounded response. For example: For many religious believers, no
secular warrant for the claim that we should care about each and
every person-that each and every person is inviolable-is
plausible; only a religious warrant is plausible.29 Therefore, to
construe the nonestablishment norm to forbid government to
disfavor conduct on the basis of a moral belief that, though
religiously grounded, lacks, or may lack, plausible, secular
grounding makes no sense at all to such believers, for whom the
only plausible response-or at least the most plausible response-to
one or more of the three fundamental moral questions is a
religiously grounded response.
Others, including some religious believers, may wonder what
sense it makes, if any, to read the nonestablishment norm to forbid
government to privilege one or more churches while leaving a
legislative majority free to make a political choice on the basis of a
moral belief that has only a religious ground-a ground that, almost
certainly, only some churches accept. Is this distinction-between,
on the one side, government privileging one or more churches and,
on the other, government making a political choice on the basis of
a moral belief having only a religious ground-merely formalistic?
goods-in particular, between what is good for some we should care about and what is good
for others we should care about? As between the first and second questions, the second-or
at least a particular instance of it-is, existentially, the more fundamental of the two.
Normally, one cares about oneself; one is committed to one's own welfare. So, a particular
instance of the question "What is truly good for those we do or should care about?" is the
question "What is truly good for oneself?" And aparticular instance of that question, in turn,
is "Which human beings is it truly good for one to care about?" But it is useful, I think, to
keep the two questions distinct: Which human beings ought we to care about? And what is
truly good for those we do or should care about-and what is bad for them?
28. Andrew Koppelman, SecularPurpose 37 (Mar. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
29. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTs: FOUR INQUiRIEs 11-41 (1998).
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Is it a distinction without a difference? Does the distinction bear the
weight I am putting on it here? This is a fair question-to which the
answer is yes, the distinction does bear the weight. It does make
sense to read the nonestablishment norm as I do. Let me explain.
Government can get along very well without privileging one or
more churches-without privileging, that is, either membership in,
or a worship practice of, one or more churches. There is simply no
practical need for government to do so; indeed, there is a practical
need for it not to do so (or so many Americans believe).3" But
legislators cannot get along without relying on moral beliefs,
because they must often resolve controverises that are fundamen-
tally and ineliminably moral in character. One may respond-
especially one who rejects religious belief-that legislators can get
along without relying on moral beliefs that lack plausible secular
grounding. But from the perspective of many religious believers in
the United States, to forbid legislators to make a political choice on
the basis of a moral belief with a religious ground, unless the belief
also has a plausible, independent secular ground (that is, for the
judiciary to strike down the political choice if it lacks plausible,
independent secular grounding), would be to import into the
Constitution a controversial conception of the proper relation
between morality and religion, according to which morality-at
least, morality "in the public square"-can and should stand
independently of religion. For some Americans-especially for some
who are not religious believers-that conception of the proper
relation between morality and religion is attractive. For the large
majority of Americans who are religious believers,"' however, their
30. See Perry, Freedom of Religion, supra note 5, at 329-32. Douglas Laycock has made
much the same point:
There is no need for the government to make decisions about Christian rituals
versus Jewish rituals versus no religious rituals at all. For government to make
that choice is simply a gratuitous statement about the kind of people we really
are. By making such statements, the government says the real American
religion is watered-down Christianity, and everybody else is a little bit un-
American.
Douglas Laycock, The Benefits of the Establishment Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 373, 380
(1992).
31. Compared to the citizenries ofthe world's other advanced industrial democracies, the
citizenry of the United States is one of the most religious-perhaps even the most religious.
According to recent polling data, " [aln overwhelming 95% ofAmericans profess belief in God."
Richard N. Ostling, In So Many Gods We Trust, TIME, Jan. 30, 1995, at 72. Moreover, "70%
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most fundamental moral judgments are inextricably rooted in their
religious faith; moreover, they are skeptical that those judgments
can stand-can be warranted-independently of religious faith,
whether their own religious faith or some religious faith. For such
Americans, to construe the nonestablishment norm to forbid
legislators to base a political choice on a religiously grounded moral
belief unless the belief also has a plausible, independent secular
ground would be to unfairly deprivilege religious faith (relative to
secular belief) as a ground of moral judgment-and to unfairly
deprivilege too, therefore, those moral judgments that cannot stand
independently of religious faith. While understandably appealing
to some who reject religious faith, such a construal is widely and
deeply controversial. Such a construal is, in a word, sectarian and
has no claim on the large majority of Americans for whom religious
faith and moral judgment are often inextricably related.
From the perspective of those for whom their religious faith and
their fundamental moral judgments are inextricably connected,
constitutional scholars like Andrew Koppelman 2 and Kathleen
Sullivan 3 (and, in an earlier incarnation, myself34) are trying to
conscript the nonestablishment norm to serve their own conception
of the proper relation between morality and religion-a contestable
and widely contested conception that should not be accorded
constitutional status in a country most of whose citizens believe
that their most fundamental moral judgments cannot stand
independently of their religious faith. Indeed, it is far from obvious
why any conception of the proper relation between morality (in the
public square) and religion-including a conception according to
which morality should stand independently of religion-should be
accorded constitutional status in a society in which the question of
the proper relation between morality and religion is so disputed. So,
let me emphasize: That there should not be a rule forbidding
political choices based on a religiously grounded belief unless the
of American adults [are] members of a church or synagogue." Book Note, Religion and Roe:
The Politics of Exclusion, 108 HARV. L. REV. 495, 498 n.21 (1994); ef Andrew Greeley, The
Persistence of Religion, CROSS CURRENTS, Spring 1995, at 24.
32. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
33. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
34. The argument I make in this Essay competes with an argument I made a few years
ago. See PERRY, supra note 7, at 30-38. For critical commentary on my earlier argument, see
Laycock, supra note 13.
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belief also has a plausible secular ground does not entail that there
should be a rule that such choices may not be based on a secularly
grounded belief unless the belief also has a religious ground.
Neither rule should be part of our constitutional law. It comes as no
surprise that there has never been a movement to constitutionalize
anything like the latter rule, but Koppelman, Sullivan, and some
others would have the Supreme Court constitutionalize something
like the former rule.
In the course of (e-mail) discussions as I was revising this Essay,
Andrew Koppelman pressed the question "why it's appropriate for
the state to be determining the authoritative sources of theological
guidance."" (According to Koppelman, for government to disfavor
conduct on the basis of the belief that the conduct is immoral is, in
the absence of a plausible, independent secular ground for that
belief, "indistinguishable from, and amounts to, a state determin-
ation of the authoritative sources of theological guidance." 6 ) But I
am not arguing that government may determine "the authoritative
sources of theological guidance" for you, or for me, or indeed for
anyone, as we or they struggle to discern the correct answer to one
or another controversial moral question. I am arguing only that in
deciding whether to disfavor conduct (at least partly) on the ground
that the conduct is immoral, one or more legislators--even a
majority of them-may answer the question of whether the conduct
is in fact immoral on the ground or grounds in which they have the
most confidence, in which they place the most trust, and then make
their political choice accordingly. In particular, they may do so
whether or not the ground(s) is religious-and, so, even if it is
religious.3 7 Koppelman's position, by contrast, is that they may not
do so if the ground is religious, unless there is a plausible,
independent secular ground for the view that the conduct is
immoral.38
35. E-mail message from Andrew Koppelman to Michael Perry (June 27, 2000) (on file
with author).
36. E-mail message from Andrew Koppelman to Michael Perry (July 31, 2000) (on file
with author).
37. Of course, this is not to say that the political choice they make-for example, a choice
disfavoring racial intermarriage, or same-sex marriage, on the ground that it is immoral-is
necessarily constitutional. The choice may violate a constitutional provision other than the
nonestablishment norm.
38. One might be tempted to respond along these lines: The nonestablishment norm,
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Nothing I have said is meant to deny that religious grounds for
moral belief are destined to be controversial in a religiously
pluralistic society like the United States. But secular grounds for
moral belief are destined to be controversial---"sectarian--too. As
Chris Eberle has argued:
The challenge to the advocate of restraint is that of discovering
some relevant difference between religious and secular norms
in virtue of which it is reasonable to advocate restraint
regarding the former but not the latter. Only by identifying
some such relevant difference can the advocate of restraint non-
arbitrarily exclude religious but not secular grounds from
political deliberation. "
In the context of this Essay, the question is whether any "relevant
difference" warrants a construal of the nonestablishment norm
according to which (a) government is free to make a political choice
on the basis of a moral belief that has a plausible, independent
secular ground, no matter how controversial that secular ground
may be, and without regard to whether the moral belief also has a
religious ground, but (b) government is not free to make a political
choice on the basis of a moral belief that has a religious ground, no
matter how ecumenical (i.e., widely shared among religious
denominations) that religious ground may be, unless the moral
belief also has a plausible, independent secular ground?4 ° One
understood as Koppelnanunderstands it, is concemedwith legislative "outputs" rather than
with legislative "inputs." See Koppelman, supra note 28, at 42. Therefore, no one who accepts
thatunderstandingofthe nonestablishmentnorm need dispute the claim that legislators are
constitutionally free to proceed on the ground(s) in which they have the most confidence, in
which they place the most trust, even if the ground is religious.
The problem with this response is that according to Koppelnan's understanding of the
nonestablishment norm, if at the end of the day the legislature decides to disfavor the
conduct on the basis of the belief that the conduct is immoral, and if there is no plausible,
independent secular ground for that belief, the legislature's decision violates the
nonestablishment norm. So, pace Koppelman, a legislature is not constitutionally free to
proceed on the basis of a moral belief that has only a religious ground-a moral belief that
lacks a plausible, independent secular ground.
39. Christopher J. Eberle, Why Restraint is Religiously Unacceptable, 35 RELIGIOUs
STuD. 247,261-62 (1999).
40. It would beg the question to invoke the nonestablishment norm in support of that
construal ofthe norm: The question athandis precisely whether the nonestablishment norm
should be so construed. The claim that such a construal of the nonestablishment norm is
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needs a most compelling argument to warrant such a problematic-
indeed, sectarian-reading of the nonestablishment norm. I am
myself aware of no such argument."'
In the absence of such an argument, deprivileging religious
grounds for moral belief relative to secular grounds would be
conspicuously unfair. Such deprivileging would discriminate
against religious grounds for moral belief, thereby subverting the
equal citizenship of religious believers who, unlike citizens who are
not religious believers, would be prevented from having their most
important moral beliefs transformed into law (absent a plausible,
independent secular grounding for those beliefs). 2
axiomatic for Americans is simply mistaken.
41. Cf Michael W. McConnell, Political and Religious Disestablishment, 1986 BYU L.
REV. 405, 413 ("Religious differences in this country have never generated the civil discord
experienced in political conflicts over such issues as the Vietnam War, racial segregation, the
Red Scare, unionization, or slavery.").
One might want to argue that under my reading of the nonestablishment norm, all sorts
of terrible things could happen-for example, a legislature could ban the use of all electrical
devices on Sundays (except, perhaps, those necessary to protect lives) on the basis of a
biblically grounded moral belief. Does anyone really believe that any legislative body would
even want to do such a thing, much less actually do it, were there no nonestablishment
norm? (Do legislative bodies in other advanced industrial democracies-democracies that
have no nonestablishment norm-do such things?) Is the nonestablishment norm,
understood as Koppelman does, really all that stands between us and such a frightening
state of affairs? If the "parade of horribles" argument is the last resort of those who would
defend the understanding of the nonestablishment norm against which I argue here, I am
content to rest my case.
Although one or more legislatures in the United States might want to do some things that
many would regard as trouble, let us not forget that the "terrible" things a legislature might
want to do-for example, ban pre-viability abortions-are almost certainly all things for
which there is a plausible secular rationale. See supra text accompanying note 21. The
nonestablishment norm, understood as Koppelman does, is no impediment to legislatures
doing such things. This is not to say there is never a constitutional impediment to a
legislature doing such a thing, just that the nonestablishment norm is not an impediment.
42.
[Tihose whose understandings of justice are derived from religious sources
(would be] second-class citizens, forbidden to work for their principles in the
public sphere. This understanding [of the nonestablishment norm] would be a
sharp and unwarranted break from our political history. From the War for
Independence to the abolition movement, women's suffrage, labor reform, civil
rights, nuclear disarmament, and opposition to pornography, a major source of
support for political change has come from explicitly religious voices.
Michael W. McConnell, Freedom of Religion at a Crossroads, 59 U. CmH. L. REV. 115, 144
(1992) (commenting on the "secular purpose" prong of the so-called Lemon test).
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In my judgment, the nonestablishment norm does not stand in
the way of citizens or legislators or other policymakers banning or
otherwise disfavoring conduct on the basis of a religiously grounded
belief that the conduct is immoral, even if the belief lacks plausible,
independent secular grounding.'
43. This is not to deny that the free exercise norm forbids government to discriminate
against religion, including religious conduct. Whatever else it maybe, the free exercise norm
is an antidiscrimination norm, as I have explained elsewhere. See Perry, Freedom of
Religion, supra note 5, at 297-302.
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